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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Spencer Cox appeals, contending that, by facilitating the dog's entry into the car before it
alerted, the dog sniff amounted to an impermissible warrantless search under the Fourth
Amendment, or alternatively, that it violated his rights under the Idaho Constitution, which
should be read to provide greater protections than its federal counterpart.
The State's response under the Fourth Amendment relies on cases which turn on who
physically opened the car door without mentioning the Court of Appeals decision which
expressly held that who opens the door is "constitutionally irrelevant." State v. Irwin, 143 Idaho
102, 106 (Ct. App. 2006). Under the proper analysis, since the officers made it easier for the
drug dog to enter and sniff the interior of Mr. Cox's car, which he had not voluntarily exposed to
the public, by not shutting the door before conducing the sniff, they facilitated the dog's entry
into the car. As such, that intrusion violated Mr. Cox's Fourth Amendment rights.
The State also contends the district court implicitly ruled on Mr. Cox's claim under the
Idaho Constitution.

However, the fact that the district court was skeptical, and so, asked

questions of Mr. Cox at the argument does not reveal the legal basis for any such implicit
decision, especially as it relates to how it considered the precedent Mr. Cox presented in answer
to those questions. On the merits of that issue, the State only responded to three of reasons for
greater protections discussed in the Appellant's Brief, thereby waiving its responses to the other
reasons discussed therein. Moreover, the arguments the State did make are either contrary to the
applicable precedent or miss the point entirely.
For all those reasons, this Court should reject the State's arguments and reverse the
district court's decision under either the state or the federal constitution.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated m
Mr. Cox's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are incorporated
herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUES
I.

Whether the officers facilitated Geno's entry into the car, such that the dog sniff of the
interior was warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, by not shutting the
car door, which had been opened in response to their knock.

II.

Alternatively, whether Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides greater
protections against warrantless entries into, and thus, unreasonable searches of, the
protected interiors of cars by drug dogs.

3

ARGUMENT
I.
The Officers Facilitated Geno's Entry Into The Car, Such That The Dog Sniff Of The Interior
Was Warrantless Search In Violation Of The Fourth Amendment, By Not Shutting The Car
Door, Which Had Been Opened In Response To Their Knock

A.

The State Has Essentially Conceded That The Two Statements Of Fact Challenged By
Mr. Cox Were Clearly Erroneous
Mr. Cox identified two statements of fact from the district court's order which were not

supported by substantial and competent evidence - that, "[ a]t no point did Geno actually get into
the vehicle" and that Mr. Cox "voluntarily opened the door for the officers." (App. Br., pp.7-9.)
The State responded that the district court did not actually mean what it said in both those
instances. Specifically, to the first statement, it argued, "it is clear that the court meant that the
dog did not, unlike the drug dogs in [other cases], fully enter the vehicle, but instead merely
crossed the threshold of the open door." 1 (Resp. Br., p.12 ( emphasis from original).) Similarly,
the State argued it was clear that the second statement "was limited to factual findings that: (1)
Cox, and not the officers, physically opened the door; and (2) officers did not directly order Cox
to open the door. The court understood that Cox opened the door in response to the officers
knocking on the window." (Resp. Br., p.13.)
By arguing that the district court's understanding was more limited than its statements
actually asserted, given what the facts in the record actually show, the State has effectively
conceded that the overly-broad statements appearing in the district court's order are, in fact,

1

The State also effectively concedes that the dog "entered the car" by going into the negative
space between the open door and the body of the car by arguing that the distinction between
crossing the threshold of the open door and entering the negative space "is of no significance in
this case because the drug dog clearly intruded both into this area and into the car itself." (Resp.
Br., p.13.)
4

clearly erroneous. As such, this Court should not defer to them. See State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho
163, 166 (Ct. App. 2011). Rather, this Court should evaluate this case in light of the actual facts
as conceded by the State - that Geno did, in fact, "enter" the car during the sniff and that
Mr. Cox only opened the door in response to the officers knocking on the window. (See Resp.
Br., pp.12-13.)

B.

Geno's Entry Into The Car During The Sniff Was Unlawful Under The Fourth
Amendment Because It Was Facilitated By The Officers' Decision To Not Close The
Door Before Conducting The Sniff
As the State has conceded, Geno crossed the threshold of the car during the sniff by

entering the negative space created by the open door and by putting his nose into the body of the
car.

(See Resp. Br., p.12.) Cars, particularly their interiors, are protected under the Fourth

Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (hooding a physical trespass
against a car left in a public parking lot violated the Fourth Amendment); State v. Gibson, 141
Idaho 277,281 (Ct. App. 2005) (reiterating that the automobile exception only allows a search of
the interior of a car if the officers have probable cause that it contains contraband or evidence of
a crime). Any physical invasion of a protected space by a government agent, "'even a fraction of
an inch"' constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 2 State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817,
822 (2004) (quoting Ky/lo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001)).
The State argues directly contrary to this precedent, asserting that, since "the drug dog's
intrusion into the car was minimal - the dog did not jump entirely into the car[, t]he district court
properly denied Cox's motion to suppress." (Resp. Br., p.12.) That argument should be rejected

2

Drug dogs are tools used by government agents, and so, cannot invade the protected space any
more than their human companion could. See generally Flordia v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9
(2013).

5

because it is flatly contrary to Idaho Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court precedent.
Geno's intrusion into the protected space, however minimal that intrusion might have been, still
violated Mr. Cox's Fourth Amendment rights. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37; Maland, 140 Idaho at 822.
To try to avoid that conclusion, the State relies heavily on the Court of Appeals' decision
in State v. Naranjo, 159 Idaho 258 (Ct. App. 2015), and the related federal court decisions which
draw a distinction under the Fourth Amendment between a dog entering the car on its own, as
opposed to having its entry facilitated by the officer. (Resp. Br., pp.9-12.) However, the State
offers no response to Mr. Cox's argument about how that rule improperly promotes arbitrary
enforcement of the Fourth Amendment's protections in such situations. (See App. Br., p.12 n.5;

see generally Resp. Br.) Since the Fourth Amendment does not tolerate rules which allow for
arbitrary enforcement at the total discretion of the officer, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
654, 661 (1979), this Court should reject the State's argument in that regard.
Moreover, the State's argument fails to even acknowledge another Court of Appeals
decision that is directly relevant to that analysis - State v. Irwin, 143 Idaho 102 (Ct. App. 2006).
(See generally App. Br.) The Irwin Court held that the question of who physically opens a car
door is "constitutionally irrelevant." Irwin, 143 Idaho at 105-06 (finding no Fourth Amendment
violation in the fact that the officer himself opened the car door when he ordered the occupants
out during a justified traffic stop). Thus, the State's reliance on the contrary federal district court
decisions is improper because those decisions tum, at least in part, on an analysis of who
physically opened the door. See, e.g., United States v. Sharp, 689 F.3d 616, 619-20 (6th Cir.
2012) (distinguishing cases on that fact); United States v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209, 214 (3d Cir.
2010) (same).

6

Finally, the State's reliance on Naranjo does not save its argument in the face of Irwin.
That is because dog sniffs are only permissible, according to the United States Supreme Court, if
they are sniffing an area that the defendant has voluntarily exposed to the public examination.
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). That is important because, when a dog is

deployed beyond the permissible scope, the dog sniff constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2013) (holding that bringing a dog to the door
of a house exceeded the limited license, and therefore, was a search of the protected curtilage).
Irwin indicates that, when the door is opened at the officer's direction, the interior is not

"voluntarily" exposed to the public.

See Irwin, 143 Idaho 105-06; accord United States v.

Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1388 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38,

42 (1976)) (specifically holding that to be the case). Therefore, a dog cannot properly enter and
sniff the interior of a car when the door is only opened in response to the officer's knock (his
non-verbal request for the door to be opened), because the interior in that case was not
voluntarily exposed to the public.
That rule even seems to be present in Naranjo, where the Court of Appeals explained
only that ''Naranjo left his driver's side window open," and "no officer opened Naranjo 's
window." Naranjo, 159 Idaho at 259, 260. Since Irwin had already made it clear that it was not
important who opened the window because it (likely involuntarily) revealed the interior to the
same extent, and since Place ho Ids that the focus is on whether the area sniffed had been
voluntarily exposed, what the Naranjo Court was necessarily getting at was that the defendant in

7

that case had voluntarily exposed the interior of his car to the public. 3 Only in that way would
the dog sniff of the interior of his car be consistent with Place and Jrwin. 4
Here, unlike Naranjo, the record is clear that Mr. Cox did not expose the interior of his
car to the public of his own volition because when the officers approached his car, the doors and
windows were all closed, and he only opened the door response to the officer's knock. (See

generally Exhibit 1.) As such, Geno's sniff was, contrary to the sniff in Naranjo, not of a place
Mr. Cox voluntarily exposed to the public. That means the sniff of the interior of the car was not
proper under Place. In other words, by not closing the car door before conducting the dog sniff,
the officers made it easier for Geno to enter and sniff the still-protected interior of Mr. Cox's car,
which means they facilitated the dog's improper entry into the car. As such, even under the rule
for which the State is arguing, Mr. Cox's Fourth Amendment rights were violated in this case.

3

For example, if the defendant in Naranjo had been driving with his window open prior to the
traffic stop, he could be said to have already voluntarily exposed the interior of his car to the
public.
4
Naranjo remains troubling because the rule it adopted from the federal courts does not address,
much less mesh with, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Jones, where the Supreme
Court found a violation of the Fourth Amendment simply in the physical trespass into a car. See
Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 n.3. Under Jones, the dog's actual intrusion into the car would be a
physical trespass, and thus, a Fourth Amendment violation regardless of whether the entry was
instinctual or facilitated. That is also one of the reasons why, as discussed in Section II(B) infra,
the Idaho Constitution should be read to provide more protection in that context, at least until the
United States Supreme Court has the opportunity to address that particular issue. (See also App.
Br., pp.IO, 19.)
8

II.
Alternatively, Article I, Section 17 Of The Idaho Constitution Provides Greater Protections
Against Warrantless Entries Into, And Thus, Unreasonable Searches Of, The Protected Interiors
Of Cars By Drug Dogs

A.

The State's Request For This Court To Find An Implicit Conclusion On Mr. Cox's Claim
Under The Idaho Constitution Is Improper Because The Record Does Not Reveal Any
Analysis By The District Court On That Issue Upon Which To Base Such An Implicit
Conclusion
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that the district court will abuse its discretion

if it does not provide "an adequate basis upon which to understand the premise behind the district
court's determination" in the record. Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 380
(2010). Thus, the appellate courts will defer to the implicit findings by the district court only
when the district court's analysis on that issue is apparent from the record. See, e.g., Schultz v.

Schultz, 145 Idaho 859, 863 (2008) (finding an implicit decision regarding the best interests of a
child because "the record contains sufficient admissible evidentiary facts [in the form of
affidavits] for this Court to review" the basis of that implicit decision).
In fact, this rule is apparent in the cases upon which the State relies, and they disprove the
State's point. For example, in Lester v. Salvino, "it is clear from the district court's statements at
the two hearings and in its memorandum decision and order that the finding was implicitly
made" that the party did not make a reasonable inquiry into the facts and legal theories when the
district court expressly ordered sanctions under I.R.C.P. 11. Lester v. Salvino, 141 Idaho 937,
941 (Ct. App. 2005). Since the district court's analysis of the specific question in Lester was
apparent on the face of the record, the appellate court had an adequate basis upon which to
understand the implicit conclusion. In State v. Wheaton, on the other hand, the dispositive point

9

was that there was no indication of any analysis by the appellant below, and as a result, the
appellate court refused to consider that issue. State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407 (1992).
Like in Wheaton, the record in this case reveals no analysis on the question of whether
there should be greater protections under the Idaho Constitution, except it was the district court,
not the appellant, that failed to conduct the analysis. Instead, all the record shows is that the
district court was skeptical of that argument, and so, asked trial counsel if there was any case law
to support that argument, such as finding additional protections under the Idaho Constitution
beyond the good faith exception, as the district court was unaware of such precedent. (Tr., p.62,
L.24 - p.63, L.10.) Mr. Cox expressly cited to State v. Thompson, which provided exactly the
information sought by the district court’s question: it held Idaho provided greater protections in
regard to the use of pen registers, and did not discuss the good faith exception. See State v.
Thompson, 114 Idaho 746 (1988); compare State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 130 (Ct. App.
1999) (in which no such justification was offered for providing additional protections).
Moreover, Thompson’s determination that the Idaho Constitution provided those additional
protections was based on “the uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing
jurisprudence.” State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 472 (2010).
That the record shows the district court may have had misgivings about the argument
does not indicate the basis on which the district court distinguished this case from Thompson or
otherwise how it might have concluded those considerations did not justify a similar protections
in the context of this case. (See generally Tr., R.) As such, the record does not provide the
necessary basis upon which to find an “implicit” decision on Mr. Cox’s claim under the Idaho
Constitution. Compare Schaffer, 133 Idaho at 130; Lester, 141 Idaho at 941. Therefore, this
Court should remand this case so that the district court might actually conduct the required

10

analysis in the first instance, as precedent requires. See State v. Fuller, 13 8 Idaho 60, 63-64
(2002).

B.

The State Did Not Address Three Of The Reasons Idaho's Constitution Should Provide
More Protection In This Situation, And Its Responses To The Other Three Either Miss
The Point Entirely Or Are Contrary To The Applicable Precedent
On appeal, Mr. Cox provided additional authorities and explanations in support of his

position that, as in Thompson, Idaho's uniqueness and its long-standing jurisprudence reveal that
the state constitution should be more protective than its federal counterpart in this regard 5 :
( 1) that Idaho's Constitution is different from the federal constitution, in that the state
constitution protects against more than just officer misconduct, and it is those justifications
which should merit additional protections against the actual intrusion into the protected space
regardless of whether the officer was trying to act reasonably (App. Br., pp.16-17);
(2) that Idaho's jurisprudence has rejected analyses of searches and seizures which tum
on a consideration of the officer's after-the-fact description of his subjective intent, and since
that is precisely what the current federal test does, the Idaho Constitution should stand as a
bulwark against that improper analysis (App. Br., pp.17-18);
(3) that Idaho's Constitution should provide more protection because the federal test does
not protect against the scenario where the dog only appears to be acting instinctively, when it is,
in fact, reacting to unconscious or subtle cues from its handler (App. Br., pp.18-19);
(4) that there is no need to risk this sort ofwarrantless intrusion at all since the legitimate
government interest can be served equally well by requiring the officers to close the door first
(App. Br., p.19);

11

(5) that Idaho's jurisprudence disfavors rules that allow for arbitrary enforcement of
search and seizure principles, and deferring to the officer's discretion as it relates to honoring a
request to close the door, or to providing the occupant a realistic opportunity to close the door
himself authorizes arbitrary enforcement of those principles (App. Br., pp.20-21); and
(6) that Idaho's Constitution actually provides more protection against the warrantless
seizure of cars without particularized suspicion of wrongdoing, and those additional protections
should also prevent officers from using dogs to warrantlessly search the interior of cars without
particularized suspicion of drug use. (App. Br., pp.21-22.)
In its Response Brief, the State only challenged the first three of those explanations. (See
Resp. Br., p.20 (identifying the three arguments it was taking issue with); see generally Resp.
Br., pp.20-24.) As such, it has waived any response to the latter three explanations. State v.
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996). As such, this Court should find the Idaho Constitution

provides additional protections in this scenario for those three reasons. A contrary rule would
allow for arbitrary enforcement of search and seizure principles, as not all officers may share
Officer Green's practice of honoring requests to shut or allow the person to shut the door
themselves. Such a rule is particularly troubling since it does not actually further any legitimate
government interest. (See, e.g., Tr., p.25, Ls.2-22 (Officer Green testifying that whether the door
is opened or closed should not affect the dog's ability to detect an odor, if one is present).) Thus,
there is no reason to endorse a rule which creates an unnecessary risk for purposeless intrusions
into the spaces in every traffic stop, regardless of whether there is particularized suspicion of
drug use, under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution.

5

Presenting additional arguments and authorities in support of the position taken below is, of
course, proper on appeal. State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, _ , 443 P.3d 231, 239 (2019); Ada
County Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, 142 n.2 (2017).
12

This Court should reach the same conclusion under the first three reasons Mr. Cox
presented because the State’s responses in those regards is contrary to the applicable precedent or
misses the point entirely. The State’s argument about State v. Pettit and State v. Guzman fails for
both reasons. First, the State’s attempt to distinguish those cases on their facts misses the point.
The rationales underlying the decisions in both Pettit and Guzman demonstrate that the
protections in the Idaho Constitution are, at a basic level, different from their federal counterparts
(despite the similarity of the wording) because Idaho’s protections do more than address officer
misconduct. See State v. Pettit, 162 Idaho 849, 854-55 (Ct. App. 2017); State v. Guzman, 122
Idaho 981, 992-93 (1992). Essentially, the additional scenarios in which Idaho will suppress
evidence outline the scope of Idaho’s additional protections. As such, even if those two cases
were not directly applicable, the rationales underlying those decision is still relevant because
they show that this situation falls within the scope of Idaho’s additional protections because
Mr. Cox was still subjected to an unreasonable search.
This is why, in fact, both cases are relevant to the question in this case. In Guzman and
Pettit, as here, the concern was with the fact that the person’s privacy had actually invaded
contrary to what the law allows, albeit by a well-meaning officer. See id. Just as it did in those
cases, Idaho’s Constitution should stand as a bulwark against such actual intrusions regardless of
whether the handling officer was acting reasonably or in good faith or the dog acting
instinctively. Compare Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (holding that a physical trespass constituted a
violation of the Fourth Amendment regardless of whether there was a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the car while it was left in a public parking lot). This is particularly true since the
United States Supreme Court does not appear to have addressed the rule the federal courts use in
light of Jones. Compare Thompson, 114 Idaho at 751 (noting the Idaho Constitution would

13

stand as a bulwark against that particular type of search until the United States Supreme Court
had a chance to reconsider its precedent on that question).
The State’s response to the second reason – the consideration of the officer’s subjective
intent under the federal test – is contrary to the applicable precedent. That is because, rather than
discuss the Idaho Supreme Court cases which expressly discuss the role an officer’s subjective
intent plays in the context of the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures (a right
provided in the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 17), the State’s response relies solely on
cases discussing that concept in the context of the right to remain silent (a right provided in the
Fifth Amendment and Article I, § 13). (Resp. Br., pp.22-23 (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S.
600 (2004); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); and State v. Doe, 163 Idaho 323 (Ct. App.
2017); compare App. Br., p.18 (relying on the decisions involving searches and seizures –
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), and State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642 (2017).)
Therefore, the State’s analysis does not alter Mr. Cox’s assertion that Idaho’s precedent on this
particular point signals that the Idaho Constitution should provide more protection in this
context.
Specifically, the precedent directly on point holds the only time an officer’s subjective
intent is a relevant consideration in the context of searches and seizures is when that intent is
actually articulated at the time of the search or seizure because, in that situation, the officer’s
actual statement is a contemporaneous part of the totality of the circumstances at the time of the
seizure. Lee, 162 Idaho at 652; accord State v. Ray, 153 Idaho 564, 569-70 (2012) (“[A]n
officer’s subjective intent is only relevant if that intent has been objectively conveyed to the
person in question.”). Since the determination of whether the drug dog acted instinctively, as
opposed to at the officer’s intended direction, will almost always be discussed and determined

14

after the fact, it is not, under Idaho precedent, a valid basis upon which to evaluate the propriety
of the warrantless intrusion. Thus, even if Naranjo represents a proper understanding of the
federal constitutional rule, this Court should still reject it under the Idaho Constitution because it
is inconsistent with Idaho's existing precedent.
Finally, the State's response to the third reason - the risk that the dog will only appear to
be acting instinctively when it is, in fact, being subconsciously cued - misses the point at issue.
While the reliability of a drug dog can, as the State asserts, be challenged under the current rules,
the quality of the dog's training has nothing to do with whether it was reacting to a cue from its
handler in a particular situation. See Matthew Slaughter, Supreme Court's Treatment of Drug
Detection Dogs Doesn't Pass the Sniff Test, 19 New Crim. L.Rev. 279, 299 (2016) (discussing a
study in which law-enforcement-certified drug dogs erroneously alerted 85% of the time when
there was actually no odor present but the handler believed there would be an odor at that
location). 6 Since even well-trained dogs can succumb to subconscious or subtle cues by their
handlers, and only appear to be acting instinctively in a particular situation, the State's argument
fails to address the concern at issue. More importantly, since that concern is not addressed under

6

The State urges this Court to ignore commentaries such as Mr. Slaughter's article because they
contain information that was not presented to the district court. (Resp. Br., p.24 n.10.) That
argument is unfounded, as Idaho's courts have routinely relied on such commentaries with no
indication that they were presented below when determining what the law allows or should allow
(as opposed to addressing factual questions about the underlying case itself). E.g., Ballad v.
Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, 714 (2016) (relying on similar articles discussing empirical studies to
determine whether Idaho law should prevent juror questions during trial); State v. Wright, 147
Idaho 150, 157 (Ct. App. 2009) (relying on articles discussing empirical studies to help it defme
the circumstances relevant to deciding whether to allow expert testimony on eyewitness
identification). After all, questions of law, such as questions about the interpretation of the state
constitution, are subject to free review by the appellate court. Leavitt v. Craven, 154 Idaho 661,
665 (2012).
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the current federal test, the Idaho's Constitution should, as it did under Thompson, stand as a
bulwark against such warrantless intrusions into the privacy of its citizens.
For any or all of those reasons, this Court should hold that the Idaho Constitution, at
least, protects against a drug dog's warrantless entry into the interior of a car while conducting a
sniff by requiring the officers to shut the door before conducting that sniff.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Cox respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying his motion to suppress
under either the federal or state constitution and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 8th day of August, 2019.

/ s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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